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Comparative Freedom of Assembly and the Fragmentation of International
Human Rights Law
Orsolya Salát*
Assistant Professor, Faculty for Social Sciences, ELTE University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
& Junior Research Fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, HAS Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest,
Hungary
Assuming that the issue of fragmentation of international human rights law can also be
usefully examined in the case-law on particular rights using a comparative method, this
article examines the divergence and convergence of freedom of assembly guarantees and
jurisprudence in international fora. It finds that some identified divergences in fact point
to underlying common concerns and assumptions about assemblies. On this basis, the
article argues that the fragmentation discourse is prone to structurally analogous, though
“reverse”, fallacies as the methodology of comparative law. In particular, the functionalist
method is much criticised for being apologetic or trapped within one’s own conceptual
and institutional system, a concern which might be present in the fragmentation debate as
well. The article concludes on this basis by formulating some suggestions which might be
applied to examining fragmentation in international human rights law and potentially
beyond.
Keywords: Assembly; Fragmentation; Expression; ICCPR; ECHR; Comparative Law;
Functionalism
I. Introduction
This article examines freedom of assembly clauses and case-law of international forums in
order to identify possible divergences and convergences in the level of international human
rights protection, and thereby strives to add a complementary dimension to the debate of
fragmentation in international law without engaging with the fragmentation literature per se.
It is thus assumed that comparative law might contribute to this debate on international law.
By comparing the specific human rights jurisprudence of different international conventions
and their quasi-judicial bodies, notably the ICCPR, the ECHR, the ACHPR and the ACHR,
the following is an inquiry into institutional fragmentation. It examines whether different
institutions interpreting different texts produce a different level of human rights protection in
analogous factual situations. Fragmentation is therefore understood to arise already from the
sole fact of different institutions pronouncing differently on similar cases, i.e. not only when
different institutions or regimes might clash, conflict or interact. This understanding of the
concept of fragmentation is justified in the realm of human rights law, as different human
rights treaties share a commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Freedom of assembly was chosen as it is a right proclaimed in the Universal Declaration
and guaranteed in all major human rights treaties, thus it is suitable in principle for testing
the phenomenon of fragmentation. It is also a right exercised, abused, and suppressed
intensely all around the world. These two factors on their own merit much more scholarly
attention than freedom of assembly usually receives.
*Email: salato@elte.hu
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Furthermore, a specificity of freedom of assembly is that it does not have such extensive
case-law as its cognate right, freedom of expression. This is because courts often reconfigure
assembly issues into expression issues. Consequently, freedom of assembly also attracts
relatively little attention from comparative law scholars. Freedom of assembly lacks any grand
doctrine or systematic theory even in domestic courts (except maybe the German Federal
Constitutional Court1) and in domestic scholarship. It might thus be useful to compare this
study’s perspective with the results of Ajevski’s freedom of expression paper elsewhere in this
issue. The certainly incomplete, or comparatively thin, jurisprudential corpus of freedom of
assembly on its own might contribute in different ways to the fragmentation discourse from,
for instance, case-law on freedom of expression, religion, equal treatment or fair trial rights.
Notably, in the case of an undersystematised, undertheorised, in short, understudied right
there is much less opportunity for the migration or transplanting of legal doctrines, standards,
interpretive ideas, etc. than there might be in the case of a more widely researched right and
its case-law. In contrast, the commonalities revealed in the case of freedom of assembly might
be more profound than the apparent similarities between other rights might suggest.
After a short overview of the guarantee provisions in the text of the European, American
and African regional conventions and the ICCPR (section 1), this article examines a few
assembly characteristic issues of interpretation which have arisen in some decisions of both
the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) (section 2). The ECtHR has for the
last two decades increasingly elaborated a significant jurisprudence on freedom of assembly,
while the HRC has only a few related communications. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has not handed down any decision on freedom of assembly. The African
Court of Human and People’s Rights has lately issued its very first decision2 on the merits
but the case was not about freedom of assembly.
The approach taken in this article is to examine only those questions which have arisen
both in the HRC and at the ECtHR, while it is also telling that the Inter-American system,
certainly on a continent with very lively protest movements, has not yet ruled on freedom of
assembly. The assumption is therefore that the level of fragmentation ought to be examined
only in areas which are actually problematised in these jurisdictions. These common areas are
likely to expand in the future as the jurisprudential corpus grows. However, for now, the
freedom of assembly issues which emerge as commonly significant in both of these
jurisdictions can be reduced to three questions: (i) the peacefulness requirement as a
determinant of the scope of the right to assembly (section 2.1); (ii) the question of advance
notice or permit (section 2.2); and (iii) the relationship between freedom of assembly and
freedom of expression, the most confounding conceptual issue in the area of expressive rights
(section 2.3).
The concluding section assesses the particular divergences and convergences found, and
also provides a broader assessment in light of the fragmentation claim. It concludes, at least in
relation to freedom of assembly – and contrary to the suggestion of the introductory study –
that it is not necessarily the divergence of doctrines, tests, and justifications,3 let alone texts,
but outcomes and underlying assumptions that matter for the purposes of fragmentation
scrutiny. Furthermore, the fact that it is – though substantively an article on international
human rights law – methodologically a comparative law exercise, shows up potentially
fruitful further questions for research in the field of the fragmentation of international law.
I conclude with a general suggestion that scholarship about this fragmentation could benefit
from methodological debates in comparative law, and it might be especially warranted to use
the critique of functionalism in comparative law as “an inverted mirror” in which the
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 141
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
9.1
33
.33
.13
6]
 at
 07
:43
 13
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
15
 
potential fallacies and overreach of the fragmentation approach might be more easily
identified.
II. Texts
The provisions of the conventions on freedom of assembly are reproduced in Table 1.
III. Similarities: Structure, Aims, Derogation
The texts of three assembly guarantees (ECHR, ICCPR, ACHR) are similar in that the scope
of freedom of assembly covers only peaceful assemblies, which means that non-peaceful
assemblies are not protected. Exactly what that means will be clarified below. The Banjul
Charter does not mention peacefulness in the guarantee of freedom of assembly.
Common limits are also to be found in the texts, for example, that the treaties only allow
restrictions which are “necessary in a democratic society” (in the African instrument, only
“necessary”) in the interests of certain legitimate aims. The structure of international human
rights norms is thus clearly converging. Among the listed aims common to all four
documents are national security, public safety, the protection of health or morals, and
protection of rights and freedoms of others.
Finally, none of the examined conventions considers freedom of assembly a non-
derogable right, it is included neither in ECHR, article 15, ACHR, article 27(2) nor ICCPR,
article 4.
IV. Differences
Formulations of the guarantee
Concerning the guarantee of the right to assembly, the ECHR, similar to the UDHR,
proclaims that “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly”, the Banjul Charter,
article 11 states that every individual has the right to “assemble freely with others”, while in
the ICCPR and the ACHR “the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.” This latter
formulation implies a weaker obligation4 than the others. Apart from this difference, the
ACHR adds “without arms” to “peaceful”, which is similar to the formulation of, for
example the German Basic Law, article 8.
Limits of the right (lawfulness and legitimate aim of the interference)
As to the form of the restriction, the ECHR and the Banjul Charter require that it be
prescribed/provided for by law, while the other conventions only state that the restriction
conforms with the law, apparently meaning that administrative decisions having some basis
in formal law would also suffice. In practice, however, it is clear that the ECtHR has relaxed
this requirement. No formal legislative act is required, but the norm in question has to
conform to certain substantive criteria of predictability and foreseeability.5
Apart from those mentioned above, legitimate uses of the restriction include the
prevention of disorder or crime under the ECHR and public order under the ACHR and the
ICCPR. At first sight, the European text appears narrower, but in interpretation the ECtHR
relaxes this requirement to the extent that the different textual versions are indistinguishable
in practice. There is basically no imminence or immediacy requirement,6 and the concept of
disorder is also widely understood in Strasbourg.7
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Table 1.
ICCPR: Article 21 ACHR: Article 15 ACHPR: Article 11 ECHR: Article 11
The right of peaceful assembly shall be
recognised. No restrictions may be
placed on the exercise of this right
other than those imposed in
conformity with the law and which
are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order (ordre
public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
The right of peaceful assembly,
without arms, is recognised. No
restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those
imposed in conformity with the law
and necessary in a democratic society
in the interest of national security,
public safety or public order, or to
protect public health or morals or the
rights or freedoms of others.
Every individual shall have the right
to assemble freely with others. The
exercise of this right shall be subject
only to necessary restrictions provided
for by law in particular those enacted
in the interest of national security, the
safety, health, ethics and rights and
freedoms of others.
Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly (and to freedom of
association with others, including the
right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.) No
restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of these rights other than such
as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or
morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This
article shall not prevent the imposition
of lawful restrictions on the exercise of
these rights by members of the armed
forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State.
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Authorisation for restrictions as to the personal scope of freedom of assembly
The ICCPR allows for the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces
and the police in their exercise of freedom of association (article 22), but not on freedom of
assembly (article 21). It does not contain any such authorisation for limiting the political
rights of aliens either. ICCPR, article 25 contains some rights for citizens only, however,
freedom of assembly is not one of them, so any restriction has to be justified under article
21(2).
The ECHR, article 11 specifically allows “the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration
of the State.” Article 16 states that article 11 does not hinder a state in restricting the political
activity of aliens. The ACHR does not contain a specific authorisation to restrict the political
rights of aliens, police, or armed forces. The Banjul Charter does not explicitly authorise
person-specific restrictions, but arguably the various duties in Chapter II – in future
interpretation – might place a heavier burden on groups mentioned in other texts.
V. Fragmentation of Texts – Consumed by Interpretation?
The studied conventions share similarities but differ strikingly in other respects. There is
fragmentation even within the substantial differences: for example, in the question of the
political rights of aliens, police, and armed forces, applicable standards clearly diverge.
Though the ILC report on fragmentation8 might be taken to be concerned with textual
differences, human rights scholars do not appear to be worried about them. This silence
signifies a shared understanding that human rights norms are largely immune to a strict
textual interpretation, and can be molded according to higher interpretive techniques, such
purposive, teleological and dynamic interpretation or the understanding of the convention as
a living instrument. In some cases, general (not assembly-specific) interpretation clearly
reduces these differences, such as the requirement of “prescribed by law”. In other cases –
such as specific authorisation to limit the rights of the police, armed forces or foreigners, or
with the exclusion of armed assemblies – the rationales behind the specific limits might be
easily taken into account in interpretation (in proportionality analysis) even if the text does
not explicitly state them. The next section examines to what extent this assumption holds
true with regard to selected leading cases.
VI. Interpretation
Fear of particularism, including fragmentation, arises solely from the fact of parallel
institutions, regardless of the text. Parallel institutions run the risk of diverging
interpretation even where the underlying texts match exactly, and can produce converging
interpretation even where the texts are different (perhaps within the bounds of avoiding, at
least on the surface, a contra legem interpretation).
The IACtHR and the ACtHPR have not ruled on the freedom of assembly so there is no
jurisprudence to compare. The ECtHR has an increasing corpus of article 11 case-law,
though it also started quite late, and it was actually not until 1991 that it found a violation.
The HRC has only a handful of cases under article 21. The jurisdictions, thus, though to a
differing extent, share a certain moderation when it comes to freedom of assembly. Freedom
of assembly is not at the centre of litigation, despite the fact that assemblies are ongoing all
over the world, and it would be absurd to claim, for example, that the European continent
clearly experiences more (controversial) assembly activity than its American counterpart.
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It is most likely that there are cases on assemblies decided under different rights
provisions – prime candidates are right to life, liberty and freedom of expression – in each of
the jurisdictions. (Note that none of the freedom of expression cases at the IACtHR involved
assemblies.) Here, analogous issues arising under the parallel articles in each convention are
compared in order to reach some conclusions as to the fragmentation claim. I shall start the
analysis with the ECtHR as it has the most elaborate jurisprudence. This does not imply any
preference or priority in terms of substance or quality, but is simply done for reasons of
quantity and thickness of jurisprudential layers.
VII. Peaceable and Peaceful as Delimitation of the Scope of the Right
The ECtHR’s stance on peacefulness
Article 11, similar to most other national and international instruments, protects only the
freedom of peaceful assembly. The ECHR offers substantive review in this regard; the
Stankov9 decision at least testifies to such an approach. In this case, the Bulgarian
Government argued that the ban on demonstrations organised by the United Macedonian
Organisation Ilinden was not an interference since the planned demonstrations would not
have been of a peaceful nature. The ECtHR reiterated that article 11 only protects peaceful
assemblies, but that a peaceful character is only foregone if the organisers and participants
have violent intentions. On the facts of the case, the Government could not reasonably
conclude that the planned demonstrations would be non-peaceful. The Stankov decision is
one example of substantive review which appears to stand in contradiction to several earlier
inadmissibility decisions handed down by the Commission. Chappell10 and Pendragon,11 for
example, both included complete blanket bans around Stonehenge for the period around the
summer solstice. The Commission did not find it problematic that the cause of the danger of
disturbance concededly lay outside the sphere of action of the applicants. Therefore, their
right to freedom of assembly (and religion) was interfered with without any fault on their
part. Remarkably, the Commission did not adhere to the relevant dicta of Plattform “Ärzte für
das Leben”,12 according to which states are required to take reasonable measures to prevent
the violent behavior of others threatening an of itself peaceful assembly. The Chappell–
Pendragon line of inadmissibility seems also to conflict with earlier decisions of the
Commission itself: in a 1980 case, CARAF,13 it stated that,
The possibility of violent counter-demonstrations or the possibility of extremists with violent
intentions, not members of the organising association, joining the demonstration cannot as such
take away that right. Even if there is a real risk of a public procession resulting in disorder by
developments outside the control of those organizing it, such procession for this reason alone
does not fall out of the scope of Article 11 (1) of the Convention.
In this case, a planned antifascist procession was caught up by the general ban on processions
in a certain area of London. The Commission accepted the ban as justified because earlier
protests by the National Front had resulted in serious damage to persons and property which
even large contingents of police could not prevent. In this case, therefore, the peaceful
antifascists were restricted in their assembly rights because of previously non-peaceful others.
Unlike in Chappell and Pendragon, the application was not found to be outside the scope of
article 11.
That such an application would be manifestly ill-founded today is confirmed by the
Ezelin14 jurisprudence: there the court required that a person be punished only if he himself
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committed some reprehensible act, which has since been reaffirmed, e.g. in Galstyan v
Armenia.15 Ziliberberg v Moldova is also a case involving a demonstration which gradually
turned violent, but where there was no indication that the applicant participated in the
violence; he was still fined for participating. The court emphasised that16
an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic
violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the
individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour.
How sporadic is “Sporadic” is of course open to interpretation, and one should not rush to
conclude that such demonstrations can be only dispersed where each and every participant is
violent.
On the other hand, under Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben”17 the possibility of violent
counter-demonstrations is not a reason to ban a demonstration: “[T]he authorities have a
duty to take appropriate measures with regard to lawful demonstrations in order to ensure
their peaceful conduct and the safety of all citizens.”18 It is also settled case-law that an
unlawful situation does not justify an infringement of freedom of assembly,19 certainly there
is no possibility to interpret non-peacefulness as simple unlawfulness. Furthermore – and
unlike in cases of freedom of expression, where e.g. Holocaust denial20 falls under article 17 –
abuse of rights does not figure in the jurisprudence. The ECtHR has not ruled that certain
viewpoints may in themselves amount to an abuse of the right to assembly, or are inherently
unpeaceful.21 This is a question which arose with regard to the ICCPR which is discussed
next.
The Human Rights Committee on peacefulness
During the drafting of the ICCPR, there was discussion about the definition of “peaceful”,
and whether it should be changed to “peaceable” (pacifique or paisible in French, compare
also “the right of the people peaceably to assemble” in the First Amendment to the US
constitution).
This relates to the question of whether peacefulness is a substantive or a modal question.
As mentioned above, the ECtHR clearly understands it as a question of modality: the
(intention of) violence has to be overwhelming for the assembly to lose its peaceful character,
independent of the theme or the political stance of the participants.
During the drafting process of the ICCPR, the Soviet Union wanted to exclude
assemblies (or any activities) of fascist or antidemocratic movements from the protection.22
This approach was rejected, however, and no specific substantive stance lies outside the
protection of article 21.
In accordance with the modal approach, the HRC urged the Russian Federation (in
2003) to revise its law on “extremist activities” for being too vague to comply with article
21.23 Similarly, with regard to Hong Kong, the Committee criticised the definition of
treason and sedition for being too vague with reference to article 21.24
The positive obligation of the state to protect the peaceful character of an assembly –
especially against violent counter-demonstrators or the provocation of others, including the
police – is also recognised by the HRC.25
Again, similar to the ECtHR (see Ezelin v France, above), the HRC imposes the principle
of individual responsibility in a different formulation: with regard to Canada, it stated26 that
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the State party should ensure that the right of persons to peacefully participate in social protests
is respected, and ensure that only those committing criminal offences during demonstrations are
arrested.
This formulation shows that it is individual participation that can be peaceful or non-
peaceful, the assembly as such is not a homogeneous unit of reference.
Fragmented in peace
In sum, there is consensus under both the ECHR and the ICCPR that assemblies which lose
their peaceful character do not fall under the scope of protection of the right to assembly, and
thus can be limited without fulfilling the justification requirements in article 11(2) and article
21(2).
There is also a tendency in both jurisdictions to narrow those cases which render an
assembly non-peaceful, thus depriving it of human rights protection. Both jurisdictions
recognise the positive obligation of the state to protect the peaceful character of an assembly.
In different terms, in effect both the HRC and the ECHR uphold the principle of individual
responsibility with regard to assemblies considered non-peaceful and those upon which
sanctions can be imposed.
VIII. Prior Notice or Permit: Restriction, Determinance of Scope, and Exceptions
The ECtHR appears not to consider that the requirement of prior notice or a permit might
be a restriction on the right to freedom of assembly.27 Notice or the application for a permit
is seen as a tool to realise the state’s positive obligation to secure freedom of assembly or
enabling an assembly to occur, or even “not to use powers that [the police] may validly have
(for instance, of regulating traffic) to obstruct the event.”28
However, this does not prevent the court from gradually carving out some reasonable
exemptions from the notice requirement. It requires states not to disperse assemblies for the
sole reason of their being unnotified,29 and acknowledges the right to spontaneous or
“urgent” demonstrations, at least as an immediate response to a political event.30
The HRC, on the other hand, appears to consider prior notice or a permit to be a
restriction for the purposes of article 21 inquiry, but it accepts that it may be justified. In the
leading case on article 21, Kivenmaa v Finland, the Committee explicitly contemplates that
“a requirement to notify the police of an intended demonstration in a public place six hours
before its commencement may be compatible with the permitted limitations laid down in
article 21 of the Covenant.”31 Thus advance notice is clearly considered an interference with
the right.
In a case against Russia, the Committee found that serial denials of permission to hold a
picket at different suggested locations were in violation of article 21.32 In a case against
Belarus, a former opposition leader successfully argued that the non-issuance of a lawyer’s
licence because of participation at an unauthorised, but peaceful, rally violated both his right
to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly.33 Though the Committee did not
examine the authorisation requirement, it concluded that the sanctions imposed on the
applicant were not justified or necessary for either freedom of expression or freedom of
assembly.
Thus, despite the fact that the Committee does not operate a spontaneous demonstration
clause, it might arrive at the same conclusion as the ECtHR, especially when the notice
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system is misused by government. In effect, in these cases the violation lies in abusively
denying a permit or disproportionately sanctioning the holding of an assembly without prior
notice or permit.34 These are exactly the concerns animating the decisions in Oya Ataman &
Bukta at the ECtHR.
Another way of avoiding the burdens flowing from assembly laws in both jurisdictions is
the pronouncement of the applicability of freedom of expression instead of freedom of
assembly, as will be discussed next.
IX. Conceptual Issues: The Relation to Freedom of Expression
Conceptualities and, more specifically, the relation between freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly are neuralgic questions in every jurisdiction aware enough to take these
rights seriously. The following comparison should thus be seen as providing a snapshot at the
crossroads of institutional fragmentation and the overlap of the scope of rights
(“Grundrechtskonkurrenz”).
X. The ECtHR on the Relation between Assembly and Expression
The ECtHR only lately contended explicitly that the freedom of assembly, just as its twin-
right of association in article 11,35 has an autonomous meaning under the Convention.36
The Commission has already noted, and the court has since embraced as a constant reference
that “freedom of assembly covers both private meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares
as well as static meetings and public processions;”37 it can be exercised both by individuals
and those organising the assembly.38 Most probably, however, it does not cover ad hoc or
accidental gatherings of people without a purpose, or for purely social purposes.39
Protests and direct action where only one or a few participants appear are covered by the
freedom of expression right of article 10.40 Article 11 is in general considered lex specialis to
article 10, thus article 10 doctrine can always apply to assemblies, while the connection is not
valid the other way around.
Contrary to some national jurisdictions (notably the United States41 and Germany42),
the ECtHR does not apply any modality doctrine which would allow for greater restriction
on the “form” of expression (including forms of assembly, such as marching or other
conduct) than on their “content” or “substance”. In relation to the press, the court declared
in 1991 that “not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the
form in which they are conveyed” is protected by Article 10.43 In 2009, the court expressly
applied this doctrine to an assembly advocating reproductive rights on a boat off the
Portuguese shore which was prevented from entering territorial waters by a war vessel. A
demonstration held on a boat in the territorial waters of a state was considered by the court
to be a “mode of diffusion of information and ideas”, restrictions on which, in certain
situations, “can affect in an essential manner, the substance of the information and ideas in
question.”44
In these cases, the ECtHR is thus unequivocally clear about the meaning generating
function of the modalities (be they of assemblies or of other expressive activities).
Nevertheless, the court recently contended that “even otherwise protected expression is not
equally permissible in all places and all times.”45 “Interference … might be legitimate when
the particular place and time of the otherwise protected expression unequivocally changes the
meaning of a certain display.”46 Thus, context and circumstances matter. The case of Fáber v
Hungary concerned the removal, detention and administrative fine resulting from the display
148 Orsolya Salát
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
9.1
33
.33
.13
6]
 at
 07
:43
 13
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
15
 
of an Arpad-striped flag (an old Hungarian flag used by the arrow cross movement in World
War 2) at a site where Jews were murdered in great numbers by the Danube in Budapest
during World War 2. The court found article 11 (including notice requirement)
inapplicable, but found a violation of article 10. Notably, the removal of the flag could
not be justified under any provisions of para 2, as it was a lawfully displayed flag with
multiple meanings and, in the present case, was not used to identify with a totalitarian
regime.
Another recent decision against Hungary implies a clear distinction between expression
and assembly for the purposes of fundamental rights restriction. The case involved a two-
person performance beside the Hungarian Parliament consisting of hanging out several items
of cloths on a fence, symbolising the Nation’s “dirty laundry”, in protest against the political
crisis ongoing since 2006. The performance lasted only a few minutes, was followed by a
dialogue with journalists, and then ended. The performers were later fined for “abuse of
freedom of assembly” as they had not notified their “demonstration”. The court dismissed
the government’s argument that the performance was to qualify as an assembly, which falls
under the assembly law, and can be subjected to a requirement of prior notice. On the
contrary, the ECtHR doubted that such a short two-person “event could have generated the
gathering of a significant crowd warranting specific measure on the side of the authorities.”47
Had the specific measure been warranted, freedom of assembly (instead or alongside freedom
of expression) would have been applicable, which would have allowed for the imposition of a
notification requirement.48 By requiring advance notice for the 13-minute, 2-person
performance, however, “[t]he national authorities’ approach to the concept of assembly
does not correspond to the rationale of the notification rule.”49 The rationale of the
notification rule is the effective coordination and facilitation of assembly, the prevention of
public disorder or the protection of the rights of others. The lack of these specific concerns
rendered the short, 2-person performance under article 10 instead of article 11. This
confirms the fall-back nature of article 10 (or the lex specialis status of article 11) as developed
in earlier case-law, and implies that for the assembly law to “kick in” some additional, specific
concerns are required. In this regard, freedom of assembly is considered a freedom of
expression discounted by the mentioned police powers, a kind of “freedom of expression
minus”.
This view is strengthened by another already mentioned, otherwise very much rights
protective decision from 2009.50 In this case, a vessel providing information about abortion
and family planning (“Women on Waves”) was denied entry to the territorial waters of
Portugal. The ECtHR found the issue best and sufficiently examined under Article 10,
because the principal grievance consisted of the denial of “their right to inform the public
about their stance on abortion and women’s rights in general.” (§ 28) The court explicitly
stated that article 10 “protects equally the mode of diffusion of ideas and opinions” (§30).
In sum, it appears that the ECHR (i) is willing to recognise the expressive potential of the
“modalities” of an assembly, but that (ii) it still might allow heavier or different restrictions
on assemblies than on speech, if those restrictions correspond to the additional externalities
of assemblies.
XI. Relation of Assembly and Expression under the HRC Jurisprudence
The HRC appears also somewhat confused over the issue of the relation of articles 19 and
21, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. The Committee sometimes rejected the
assembly claim, but declared the claim admissible under freedom of expression.
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Coleman v Australia involved a condemnation for taking part in a public address (a one-
person political speech in a mall of about 15–20 minutes’ duration) without prior written
permit from the town council.51 The complainant argued that the conviction violated article
21 and article 19. The HRC declared the article 21 part of the complaint was inadmissible
for lack of substantiation, but found a violation of article 19, for unnecessary restriction.
In one of its few cases on article 21, Kivenmaa v Finland, the HRC faced the question of
a “protest in a cheering crowd”, i.e. a situation where a minority in an audience engaged in a
protest performance while the others were merely onlookers of an event against which the
complainants protested. Ms. Kivenmaa, together with 25 other members of the Social
Democratic Youth Association, went into a crowd gathering next to the Presidential Palace
on the occasion of a visit of a foreign head of state. They distributed leaflets and raised a
banner critical of the human rights record of the visiting head of state. She was charged with
holding a public meeting without prior notice. Domestic courts found that Ms. Kivenmaa’s
group was distinguishable from the crowd, and thus she could be considered to have
organised a public meeting. She claimed, among others, that articles 19 and 21 ICCPR have
been violated. The Committee, though not denying that the requirement of notice for a
demonstration may be justified, found “evident from the information provided by the parties
that the gathering of several individuals at the site of the welcoming ceremonies for a foreign
head of State on an official visit, publicly announced in advance by the State party
authorities, cannot be regarded as a demonstration” (emphasis added).
The claim of the state, that displaying a banner turned the presence of Ms. Kivenmaa’s
group into a demonstration, was rejected by the Committee with the argument “that any
restrictions upon the right to assemble must fall within the limitation provisions of article 21.
A requirement to pre-notify a demonstration would normally be for reasons of national
security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Consequently, the application of Finnish
legislation on demonstrations to such a gathering cannot be considered as an application of a
restriction permitted by article 21 of the Covenant” (§9.2).
This reasoning is, at the very least, unclear, if not manifestly incomprehensible and
illogical.52 At the very least, the Committee should have accepted that it was a demonstration
and that, as such, it might be subject to six hours’ notice, but in this case the notice
requirement was not necessary, or that – as the ECtHR sometimes rules – the lack of notice
did not authorise the dispersal of the demonstration, or the prevention of Ms. Kivenmaa
continuing her protest, including raising the banner. Bidault speculates that considerations of
non-discrimination might have animated the Committee not to accept that the protesters
were a demonstration.53 I would further translate these as concerns over content neutrality
which disprove additional burdens flowing from the categorisation of being an assembly,
while the others, of an opposing mindset, are only categorised as spectators, spared from any
administrative burden.
Different doctrine, similar assumption
Before forming more determinate conclusions on the background considerations which
might have animated the curious (and sparse) reasoning in Kivenmaa, a parallel case at the
ECtHR is worth examining. Chorherr v Austria is factually analogous, though it did not turn
on conceptual issues in relation to speech, and was considered solely under the free
expression guarantee – what often and tellingly happens to assemblies. The case involved a
military parade where applicants went in with placards and leaflets to protest against Austria’s
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acquisition of interceptor fighter planes. Pacifists slightly interfered with the view of a few
parade-watchers, causing some commotion among the spectators (though if they moved
away, they could see fully). Applicants were removed from the scene, and later convicted for
administrative offences against public decency and breach of the peace. They claimed
violation of article 10 at Strasbourg, and did not invoke freedom of assembly at all. The
ECtHR found that the restriction fell within the margin of appreciation, and was considered
non-excessive to the potential disturbance Mr. Chorherr “must have realised”, and also
because the measures were imposed in order “to prevent breaches of the peace and not [in
order] to frustrate the expression of an opinion.”54
In my view, it could be credibly argued that this is exactly what happened in the case of
Ms. Kivenmaa: she was clearly singled out for expression of a specific opinion. Of course,
Chorherr would have been likely to have turned out differently following the Arpad flag
decision at the ECtHR. Nonetheless, if the pacifists were genuinely removed not for their
views, but for the commotion they caused, then maybe that which looks so different from so
many viewpoints underlies a very similar consideration. If you are harassed for your opinion,
then it is a violation of your free expression rights, and that violation should not be covered
up and argued away in the disguise of freedom of assembly, with its potentially more
extensive permissible limits (such as the requirement of prior notice). However, if you are
held responsible for the consequences of your behavior, your expression rights are not
violated.
On the other hand, the Coleman case of the HRC, involving a one-person public address,
is analogous to the ECtHR decision discussed above (the Nation’s “dirty laundry
performance”). The assembly claim of Mr. Coleman was dismissed, while the Hungarian
government’s argument relying on freedom of assembly was also rejected in the “dirty
laundry performance” case. Whether or not the HRC did something different in the
Coleman case than the ECHR did in the “dirty laundry performance” case depends on our
perspective, or, more precisely, how distanced we are when we look at the decisions. The
diverging approach to the assembly claims can be either considered (i) a difference arising out
of institutional fragmentation; or (ii) a wholly innocent contingency of the complaints – in
one case explicitly referring to freedom of assembly next to freedom of expression, and not in
the other; or (iii) a wholly innocent contingency of divergent regulation: the Queensland
town requires a permit even for a one-person public addresses, while in the Hungarian case,
quite to the contrary, notice could only be required if something could be qualified as an
“assembly.” All these differences and contingencies however do not account for – but rather
disguise – the similarity of concerns motivating the overlapping outcome, i.e. violation of
freedom of expression.
XII. Elusivity of the Debate or Elusivity of the Subject: The Comparative Lawyer’s
Interpreting “Fragmentation”
From this short and in fact fragmented inquiry, four particular technical conclusions arise as
to divergence and convergence.
First, with regard to the text of the guarantees in the different jurisdictions, there are
partial overlaps but also some significant differences. None of them appears really to give
reason to worry, in the same way as differences in constitutional texts.55 Secondly, regarding
the criterion of peacefulness, the jurisdictions basically display an identical interpretation,
though of course the individual assessment might differ from one case to another just as it
might in the opinion of a majority and dissenting judge.
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In contrast, there are very clear doctrinal differences with regard to prior notice. The
ECtHR does not consider it to be a restriction, while the HRC does. The ECtHR carves out
exemptions from notice even while staying within article 11, while the HRC does not.
Finally, as to the relation between freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, the two
bodies again appear to argue very differently.
These four observations are anything but revealing for a trained eye in human rights law.
The banal differences and similarities either affect the legal situation of persons or they do
not. Nothing, or almost nothing, follows from them regarding the level of rights protection
granted in a particular jurisdiction. The human rights scholar could, on this basis, tell not
much more to the international law scholar than that the question of fragmentation is a
gradual one in human rights law. Certainly there are some divergences, but they do not seem
to be so overwhelming as to question the integrity of the human rights system. Alternatively,
there certainly are convergences, but they do not seem to be so overwhelming as to
demonstrate the unity of the human rights system. Such a conclusion, true as it is, does not
provide much added value to the fragmentation discourse.
Instead, the reasons for this state of affairs need to be explained and reflected upon. As a
result, the following more general considerations can be drawn from this short inquiry on the
freedom of assembly.
To some extent, the divergences are technical, which might not greatly affect the actual
enjoyment of the right in question. Such is the case with whether prior notice is a restriction
or not, or whether the wearing of arms at an assembly qualifies that single armed participant
immediately as non-peaceful, or not until the court has examined the justification, etc. The
sort of fragmentation which raises concern would be a divergence in the level of rights
protection in the final outcome of a case, i.e. where one could establish that a claimant would
be better off had she turned to the other organ (as it was to be feared in the Norwegian
religious education cases56). On the basis of the present inquiry, no such threat lingers over
the freedom of assembly, though of course that could change any moment.
More interestingly, paradoxically, such divergences might bring to light hidden or
unconscious but shared assumptions which are formulated in different ways in different
jurisdictions.
In my view, this happens with freedom of expression. In fact, the stances the ECtHR and
the HRC take on this issue do not have much in common on the surface of their arguments.
Nonetheless, in both jurisdictions, these different arguments highlight the same problem,
although invisible from within the jurisdiction: whether freedom of assembly is a “freedom of
expression-minus” or a self-standing, independent right. This is a slightly more visible issue
(but still not explicit) in the context of the First Amendment, where scholars talk about a
neglected or forgotten right to freedom of assembly.57 Consider the “speech plus” doctrine,58
where the additional element to speech (the “plus”) merits a “minus” in the strength of
protection.59 From a theoretical angle, some authors argue to the contrary that freedom of
assembly does not merit protection alongside freedom of expression,60 in accordance with the
fears of much early crowd psychology from Le Bon to Freud.61 Therefore, looking at human
rights jurisprudence through the lens of fragmentation might actually enhance our
knowledge and reflection on the problematic nature of a specific human right.
On the other hand, this exercise about the right to freedom of assembly might be
symptomatic of the limits of theorising on the fragmentation of human rights law in general:
the fact that there are no cases at the IACtHR, very few at the HRC, and many, but only
recently, at the ECtHR might be taken as cautionary signs that the fragmentation discourse is
not to be forgetful about the methodological dangers of unreflected comparison. Maybe
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international law could learn from the intense debates around the methodology of
comparative law. International law, especially international human rights law, in fact,
aspires to something similar to what the first methodologically conscious comparatist,
Saleilles attributed to comparative law: a “droit idéal relative”, which, if properly elaborated,
reveals a “droit commun de l’humanité civilisée”.62 A further step in the history of
comparative law aims to explicitly dispense with the sole focus on texts and formal legal rules
and look for the functions that law fulfills.63. Fully-fledged functionalism is, however,
criticised for being apologetic of or being trapped within one’s own system or culture, or
simply for misconstruing an ideal function.64 Applied to fragmentation in international law,
it can be hypothesised that those working within one regime or institution will transpose
their own texts, concepts and rules to other regimes or institutions, which contributes to the
appearance of fragmentation. It does not follow of course that there exists no real
fragmentation, just as it is surely possible to formulate and research adequately some of the
functions that law fulfills in every society. In some cases, however, what looks like legal
fragmentation might on closer inspection turn out to be the result of factual differences, of
erratic assumptions about common social problems or their weight, sheer (though inspiring)
doctrinal differences having no bearing on the actual level of human rights protection,
though surely they can be as they appear: true legal divergences. Certainly this plethora of
results is the lesson from this inquiry regarding freedom of assembly. This might suggest that
the fallacies of fragmentation discourse might be the opposite of the concerns with
comparative law: comparative lawyers tend (or at least used to, classically, e.g. Zweigert
and Kötz65) to see similarity and construct unity everywhere, while fragmentationists
overemphasise differences and tensions. However, logically, the reverse might be true, too,
but of course on a different level: ostentatious similarities, tests, doctrines, and arguments
copied might in fact be only covers for divergences, legitimising the particular decision a
given organ wishes to take (see, e.g., again from comparative law, Kahn-Freund or Vörös66).
Alternatively, one regime might for some reason resist the smooth integration of a doctrine,
test or justification seemingly identically present in another regime, and start to distort it in
order to fit into its own logic (mutatis mutandis, Somek67). These are questions and
possibilities which might potentially bear fruit when (trans)posed and examined with regard
to particular issues in the fragmentation discourse of international law.
In sum, I hope to have shown through the example of freedom of assembly in this article
that fragmentation discourse, if it is to be expanded into international human rights law,
certainly ought take into account a wide range of intermingling contextual elements (e.g. at
least in the sense of a “reverse” or inverted neofunctionalism68). These include not only the
human rights texts (at the least), applied doctrines, standards, justifications, particular facts of
the cases, and outcomes of decisions, but also – as we have seen – domestic regulations, and
procedural strategies of the applicant and government alike.
However, this might drive the debate into another impasse well-known from (and
unresolved in) comparative law. Just as comparative law is not really self-confident about
where its subject starts and ends (both vertically and horizontally), studying international law
from the perspective of fragmentation also makes the boundaries of international law – at
least international human rights law – look uncertain. An inverted comparative law
methodological awareness spills into the problem of vanishing boundaries of the subject,
international law itself, as what is traditionally understood as domestic law and legal culture
might need to be taken into account as well. That might be the price to be paid for the
avoidance of some errors due to increased self-reflection.
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